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IS TIGER WOODS'S SWING REALLY A
WORK OF ART? DEFINING THE LINE
BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
MICHAEL SUPPAPPOLA*

"Those who do not want to imitate anything, produce nothing."
- Salvadore Dali
INTRODUCTION

The age of the celebrity athlete is upon us. For better or worse,
no longer does your local hero merely hit game-winning home runs
or sink buzzer-beating fall away jumpers. He now sells you T-shirts
and educates you on a wide variety of topics, from which sneaker
will help you jump the highest to which fast-food establishment will
best satisfy your appetite.
A quick walk through your local supermarket will confirm that
it is impossible to escape the reach of celebrity athletes in today's
culture. Michael Jordan looms from cereal boxes; Donovan Mc
Nabb stares from soup cans; Sammy Sosa invites you to try a can of
soda; Markus Naslund smirks at you from the cover of a video
game; Barry Bonds scowls at you from a magazine rack. Indeed, it
is becoming increasingly difficult to imagine a world without celeb
rity athletes.
Athletic success often translates into an economic windfall for
the athlete from sources outside the athletic domain: "Through en
dorsements, licensing, sponsorships, and television spots, advertis
ers offer a seemingly unlimited source of income for today's most
popular athletes."1 Due to the increasing economic value of popu
lar athletes' identities, athletes have become determined to "hold

* Michael Suppappola is an attorney working for National Regulatory Services,
Inc. in Lakeville, Connecticut. He is a graduate of the University of Connecticut School
of Law, with honors, where he served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Connecticut Public
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1. Michael J. Breslin, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc: Turning an Athlete's
Publicity Over to the Public, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 369, 371 (2004).
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onto the hottest property they know: themselves."2 The right of
publicity affords the professional athlete the right to control the
commercial use of his or her identity.3
The majority of states now recognizes the right of publicity,
either at common law or by statute. 4 As with other intellectual
property rights, however, a right of pUblicity is "imposed at the ex
pense of future creators and of the public at large."5 Specifically,
the right of publicity often collides with a core concern of the First
Amendment, described by Justice Brandeis as the right to "self-ex
pression in all forms."6
In Cardtoons, L.c. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
Judge Tacha noted that "[t]hrough their pervasive presence in the
media, sports and entertainment celebrities come to symbolize cer
tain ideas and values. [They] are an important element of the
shared communicative resources of our cultural domain."7 Thus,
the public's First Amendment right to use an athlete's image for
purposes of expression often conflicts with the athlete's right of
publicity. Courts have struggled to establish the boundaries be
tween the right of publicity and the First Amendment.
This article explores the various justifications for affording pro
fessional athletes a right of publicity and the question how best to
balance publicity rights with First Amendment concerns. Part I
traces the history of the right of publicity, from its genesis in early
twentieth century right to privacy cases to its current status as a
generally recognized common law and statutory right. Part II fo
cuses on the "commercial/newsworthy" distinction in early right of
publicity cases, and how courts attempted to limit the boundaries of
the right of publicity in the face of First Amendment concerns. Part
III discusses the renewed battle between the First Amendment and
the right of publicity in a series of court cases from the early 1990s
to the present. Part IV analyzes the Sixth Circuit's controversial
decision in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., which held that an
artist's First Amendment right to use the image of Tiger Woods in
2. Id. (quoting Marcia Chambers, Lawsuit Pits Artists' Rights vs. Athletes', N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at D1, D4).
3. 2 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 16:24
(2004).
4. See JONATHAN S. JENNINGS, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN CYBERSPACE 1,
http://www.pattishall.comfpdfslPublicity-Cyberspace.pdf.
5. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 932 (6th CiT. 2003).
6. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8:2 (2d
ed.2000).
7. 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996).
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an expressive work of art trumped Woods's right of pUblicity.8 Part
V critiques the various balancing tests offered by courts in right of
publicity cases. Part VI addresses the fundamental question
whether an athlete's right of pUblicity should be recognized by the
courts at all.
I.

A.

HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

The Right to Privacy and the Commercial/Newsworthy
Distinction

Ironically, the right of publicity found its origins in the com
mon law right to privacy. In 1890, the Harvard Law Review pub
lished an article authored by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis entitled The Right to Privacy.9 This influential article ar
gued that "the powers of the common law should be used to protect
a right to privacy by creating a 'quiet zone' in each person's life,
immune from the prying of neighbors, the press and the public."lo
Following pUblication of the article, courts and legislatures be
gan recognizing several new tort rights under the "right to privacy"
label. l l In his 1960 article, Privacy, William Prosser articulated the
four general privacy torts as invasion of privacy by (1) intrusion; (2)
disclosure; (3) false-light; and (4) appropriation.12
Nevertheless, courts quickly recognized that "a full-blown right
in individuals to control the dissemination of personal information
would overwhelm the countervailing constitutional interest in free
speech. "13 Courts began to draw a distinction between "news
worthy" speech and "commercial" speech: the former was speech
fully protected by the First Amendment, and the latter was not. 14
"Newsworthy" speech was generally "defined as the public commu
8. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 932.
9. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
10. Breslin, supra note I, at 372 (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS
OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.11 (2d ed. 2002».
11. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 296 (1983).
12. Id. at 296-97 (discussing William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383,389
407 (1960».
13. Amicus Curiae Brief of 73 Law Professors in Support of Defendant/Appellee
Jireh Publishing, Inc. at 6, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003)
(No. 00-3584).
14. See Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1940) (limiting
right to privacy according to the newsworthiness privilege); Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905) (same).
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nication of accurate, newsworthy information."15
"Commercial" speech, however, was considered unprotected
by the First Amendment and became vulnerable to right to privacy
claims. "[A] large percentage of the early 'commercial use' cases
involved advertisements or promotions using the names or faces of
people who did not desire that form of notoriety ...."16 For exam
ple, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that "the publication of one's picture without
his consent by another as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of
increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of
[the right of privacy]."17
In addition to commercial advertisements, a number of courts
held that speech intended to "entertain" qualified as "commercial
speech."18 For example, in Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, the
Court of Appeals of New York held that speech used "to amuse
those who paid to be entertained by it" constituted "commercial"
speech. 19 Thus, so long as speech was not characterized as "news
worthy," liability "for commercial appropriation could be imposed
at will. "20

B.

Problems with the Common Law Invasion of Privacy by
Appropriation

Nevertheless, a conspicuous weakness of the "invasion of pri
vacy" doctrine was revealed when public-figure plaintiffs attempted
to take advantage of the new cause of action. The "fundamental
justification for protecting a person's right to privacy is that every
person has a right to be free from mental distress and indignity."21
Accordingly, a plaintiff could not prevail unless the court found
that commercial appropriation of his or her identity resulted in
"harm to a plaintiff's mental well-being as measured by tort-based
mental distress damages."22 Regarding public-figure plaintiffs,
15. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 13, at 6-7.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 81; see Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918) (recognizing
breach of right to privacy where plaintiff's picture used in advertisement for dry goods
store); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (finding right to privacy
breached when jewelry business used plaintiff's photograph in advertisement).
18. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 13, at 7.
19. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 103 N.E. 1108, 1111 (N.Y. 1913).
20. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 13, at 8.
21. Breslin, supra note 1, at 373 (emphasis added).
22. Id. (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRI·
VACY § 1:25 (2d ed. 2002».
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courts would rarely find "'indignity' or 'mental distress' when the
plaintiff's identity was already in widespread use in the media."23
Indeed, many athletes and entertainers actively strive to make
themselves into household names.
In O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., Pabst had used the photograph
of well-known Philadelphia Eagles quarterback David O'Brien on
an advertising calendar without O'Brien's consent. 24 O'Brien
brought suit against Pabst for invasion of his right to privacy, claim
ing that he was damaged by Pabst's misappropriation of his iden
tity.25 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
held that O'Brien could not prevail: "[C]onsidered from the stand
point merely of an invasion of plaintiff's right of privacy, no case
was made out, because plaintiff was an outstanding national foot
ball figure and had completely publicized his name and his pic
tures."26 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that O'Brien
was not a private person and "the publicity he got 'was only that
which he had been constantly seeking and receiving."'27 Neverthe
less, Judge Holmes' dissenting opinion in O'Brien foreshadowed
the creation of a right of publicity. Judge Holmes argued that a
plaintiff should be entitled to recover "the reasonable value of the
use in trade and commerce of his picture for advertisement pur
poses, to the extent that such use was appropriated by [Pabst]."28
Judge Holmes distinguished the right to privacy from what would
later become the right of publicity:
The right to privacy is distinct from the right to use one's name
or picture for purposes of commercial advertisement. The latter is
a property right that belongs to everyone; it may have much or
little, or only a nominal value; but it is a personal right, which may
not be violated with impunity.29
C.

The Birth of the Right of Publicity

The right of publicity was first recognized in Haelan Laborato
ries, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 3D In Haelan, two rival chew
ing-gum manufacturers argued over the exclusive right to use the
23.
24.

Id.
O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th CiT. 1941).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 169.
27. Id. at 170 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
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image of a professional baseball player to promote their product. 31
The "plaintiff's case hinged on asserting an exclusive property right
in the baseball player's images that appeared on the cards. "32 "The
defendant argued that the plaintiff's only viable theory of relief was
violation of the right to privacy,"33 which would fail because the
plaintiff, as in O'Brien, would be unable to show that a professional
baseball player suffered mental distress from the publication of his
photograph.
The Second Circuit, however, concluded, "[AJ man has a right
in the pUblicity value of his photograph."34 The court explained:
This right might be called a 'right of publicity.' For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and
ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, populariz
ing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, bus
ses, trains and SUbways. This right of pUblicity would usually
yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an
exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using
their pictures. 35

Just one year later, the development of the right of publicity
was "further cultivated by Melville Nimmer in his seminal article
The Right of Publicity."36 Nimmer argued that "traditional privacy
law could not adequately protect the commercial interests people
held in themselves because its protection was limited to those situa
tions involving embarrassment or humiliation stemming from unau
thorized advertising use."37
Moreover, Nimmer argued that both celebrities and private
persons should be afforded the right of publicity:
It is impractical to attempt to draw a line as to which persons

have achieved the status of celebrity and which have not; it
should rather be held that every person has the property right of
publicity, but that the damages which a person may claim for in
31. Id. at 867.
32. Breslin, supra note 1, at 375.
33. Id.
34. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
35. Id.
36. Cardtoons, L.c. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967
(10th Cir. 1996).
37. Breslin, supra note 1, at 375-76 (citing Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Pub
licity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1954)).
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fringement of the right will depend upon the value of the public
ity appropriated which in turn will depend in great measure upon
the degree of fame attained by the plaintiff. Thus, the right of
publicity accorded to each individual 'may have much or little, or
only a nominal value,' but the right should be available to
everyone. 38

By the 1990s, the right of pUblicity had developed into a well
established doctrine accepted by most courts, exemplified by its in
clusion in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which
states that a person's right of publicity is violated by the "[ appropri
ation of] the commercial value of a person's identity by using with
out consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity
for purposes of trade."39
Nevertheless, in the years following the Raelan decision, most
courts refused to legitimize the new cause of action, particularly be
cause of its "important economic and social implications. "40 The
First Amendment provided effective ammunition for courts wishing
to eradicate pUblicity rights.

II.

THE BATTLE FOR LEGITIMACY: EARLY CASES DEFINING THE
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A.

Early Balancing of the Right of Publicity and the First
Amendment
In right of pUblicity cases, courts would abide by the same rules

that pertained to privacy cases, specifically the distinction between
"newsworthy" and "commercial" publications. 41 However, "[w]hat
got lost in the process was any recognition that, by the 1950s and
1960s, those two categories were no longer synonymous with pro
tected and unprotected speech."42 For example, the Binns line of
cases (holding that speech meant to entertain should be classified as
commercial) was slowly overtaken by Supreme Court cases holding
"that fiction, film, art and other forms of speech intended to enter
tain were as fully entitled to constitutional protection as was classi
cally 'newsworthy' speech."43 In 1973, the Supreme Court made
38.
167, 170
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Nimmer, supra note 37, at 217 (citing O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d
(5th Cir. 1942) (Holmes, J., dissenting».
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
Breslin, supra note 1, at 377.
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 13, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9; see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (finding
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clear that "pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings ...
have First Amendment protection."44
Even speech that directly proposed a commercial transaction,
which was entirely unprotected prior to 1976, was afforded some
measure of First Amendment protection by the Supreme Court in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 45 Thus, courts attempting to utilize the "commercia1l
newsworthy" distinction in determining the boundary between pub
licity rights and the First Amendment were not only left without a
map, but also without a compass. Judges who were hostile to the
right of publicity used the recent expansion of First Amendment
protections to deny plaintiffs' right of publicity claims.
For example, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., Judge Frank of the New York Supreme Court refused to en
join the publishing of an unauthorized biography of Howard
Hughes. 46 Frank explained, "Just as a public figure's 'right of pri
vacy' must yield to the public interest so too must the 'right of pub
licity' bow where such conflicts with the free dissemination of
thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public inter
est."47 A few months later, Judge Frank again used First Amend
ment principles to "stifle a plaintiff's attempt to enjoin the
unauthorized sale of mock presidential campaign posters" depicting
a comedian, Pat Paulson, as a candidate. 48 Justice Frank noted,
"When a well-known entertainer enters the presidential ring,
tongue in cheek or otherwise, it is clearly newsworthy and of public
interest."49 The Supreme Court did not specifically address the
right of publicity until 1977, in the landmark case of Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 50
music, independent of its lyrics, is protected speech); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (plays); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (Amer
ican flag bearing a peace symbol); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)
(motion pictures); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (publications intended to
entertain).
44. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973).
45. 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 396-97 (1967)
(finding that works published for "trade purposes" do not lose First Amendment
protection).
46. 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
47. Id.
48. Breslin, supra note 1, at 377 (citing to Paulson v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299
N.Y.S.2d 501, 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968».
49. Paulson, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
50. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.: The Supreme
Court Tackles the Right of Publicity

Hugo Zacchini was an entertainer who performed a "human
cannonball" act in which he was shot from a cannon into a net ap
proximately 200 feet away.51 Although Zacchini specifically re
quested that reporters not film his act, a local news station
videotaped and aired a film clip of his entire fifteen-second per
formance. 52 Zacchini brought suit in Ohio for infringement of his
common law right of publicity.53 The Supreme Court of Ohio held
that a television station has a privilege to report in its newscasts
matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be pro
tected by an individual's right of pUblicity.54
The Supreme Court reversed the Ohio court, holding that
"[t ]he broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a substan
tial threat to the economic value of that performance."55 Zacchini,
however, was not exactly an overwhelming triumph of the right of
publicity over the First Amendment. The Court emphasized the
unique facts of the case, noting that the case involved "not the ap
propriation of an entertainer's reputation to enhance the attractive
ness of a commercial product," but went "to the heart of
petitioner's ability to earn a living as an entertainer. "56 Thus, the
Supreme Court's narrow holding in Zacchini is of little relevance to
later cases concerning the unauthorized use of celebrity identities to
sell a product, such as ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc. 57
Even so, the importance of Zacchini lies in its analysis of the
justifications for the right of publicity. The Supreme Court noted
that the right of publicity served:
[T]hree basic functions: (1) it prevented others from being un
justly enriched by the plaintiff's good will, (2) it kept others from
interfering with the plaintiff's right to make a living as an enter
tainer, and (3) it provided entertainers and celebrities an eco
nomic incentive to continue to invest in creating performances
that the public could enjoy.58
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
Id.
54. Id. at 565.
55. Id. at 575.
56. Id. at 576.
57. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
58. Jacy T. Jasmer, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard,
An Unworkable Decision,S MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 293, 296 (2004). The persuasive
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Zacchini is also important for its implicit holding that a state right
of publicity claim will not be automatically defeated by a First
Amendment defense; instead, the Supreme Court made clear that
the right of pUblicity and the First Amendment interest in free ex
pression must be balanced "according to the relative importance of
the interests at stake."59
III.

FREERIDING ON A CELEBRITY'S FAME AND THE BIRTH OF
THE "TRANSFORMATIVE ELEMENTS" TEST

In the years following Zacchini, courts have struggled to bal
ance right of publicity claims with the First Amendment. A recent
string of cases involving celebrities and professional athletes exem
plifies the disagreement among courts on this issue.
A.

The Second Circuit

In Rogers v. Grimaldi,60 Ginger Rogers sued the producers and
distributors of a motion picture entitled Ginger and Fred for viola
tion of her right of publicity.61 The film's title referred to the names
of its two protagonists, Ginger and Fred. The film attempted to
contrast the "elegance" of 1940s era American cinema to the
"gaudiness and banality of contemporary television, which [the di
rector] satirize[d]."62
The Second Circuit held that the right of publicity would not
bar the use of a celebrity's name in a movie title "unless the title
was 'wholly unrelated' to the movie or was 'simply a disguised com
mercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.' "63 The
court found that the title Ginger and Fred was "clearly related to
the content of the movie and is not a disguised advertisement for
the sale of goods or services or a collateral commercial product,"
and thus did not violate Rogers's right of pUblicity.64
The Second Circuit's "disguised commercial advertisement"
test has been widely adopted by other circuits, but limited to cases
where the title of an artistic work uses a celebrity's name. Never
ness of each of these justifications with respect to professional athletes will be examined
further in Part VI of this article.
59. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 806 (Cal. 2001)
(commenting on the holding in Zacchini).
60. 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
61. Id. at 996.
62. Id. at 1001.
63. Id. at 1004.
64. Id. at 1004-05.
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theless, courts utilizing the Second Circuit test have often arrived at
contrary results. In Parks v. LaFace Records ,65 the hip-hop group
Outkast was sued when it used the name of Rosa Parks in the title
of a song that did not convey factual information about Parks. The
Sixth Circuit denied Outkast's motion for summary judgment, hold
ing that" [a] reasonable finder of fact ... could find the title to be a
'disguised commercial advertisement' or adopted 'solely to attract
attention' to the work."66 The court found that there was no rela
tionship between the song's title and its content, despite the chorus
refrain of "[e]verybody move to the back of the bus."67
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found in Mattei, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc. that Aqua's song entitled Barbie Girl was not a "dis
guised commercial advertisement" because the group claimed that
the song used "Barbie's image" to comment "humorously" on
Barbie's cultural values. 68 Although Mattei was not a right of pub
licity case (the claim was trademark infringement),69 the decision
exemplifies the disparate outcomes of cases using the Second Cir
cuit test. Nevertheless, the test has thus far been limited to cases
where a product's title uses a celebrity identity, and thus does not
apply to cases such as ETW Corp. where a celebrity image has been
appropriated. 70
B.

The Sixth Circuit

Prior to its decision in ETW Corp., the Sixth Circuit decided
several cases that involved balancing the right of publicity with the
First Amendment. In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,
Inc., talk show host Johnny Carson sued a toilet manufacturer for
using Carson's popular catch phrase. 71 The Sixth Circuit found that
the defendant had violated Carson's right of publicity, holding that
"a celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial
exploitation of his identity."72 Judge Kennedy's dissent noted,
"[P]ublic policy requires that the public's interest in free enterprise
and free expression take precedence over any interest Johnny Car
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.

329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 461.
Id. at 442.
296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 899.
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 835.
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son may have in a phrase associated with his person. "73
In Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Inc.,74 Elvis
Presley's heirs sued the defendant for creating a large, bronze
statue and numerous small pewter copies to honor the deceased
singer. "Although the case was decided on other grounds," Judge
Meritt "referred to the existence of significant First Amendment
questions" and "to the importance of allowing information and
symbols to enter the public domain where all are free to use
them."75
C.

The Tenth Circuit

Seven years before ETW Corp., the Tenth Circuit decided a
case focusing on the right of publicity with respect to professional
athletes. In Cardtoons, L. C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, the Tenth Circuit held that baseball card parodies of several
professional baseball players did not violate the athletes' rights of
pUblicity.76 The court "did not base its decision on some special
First Amendment status enjoyed by parody.... Rather, the court's
discussion took into consideration ordinary trading cards as well,
terming all of them 'an important medium for disseminating infor
mation.'''77 The court found that the cards should receive full First
Amendment protection:
Cardtoons's parody trading cards receive full protection under
the First Amendment. The cards provide social commentary on
public figures, major league baseball players, who are involved in
a significant commercial enterprise, major league baseball.
While not core political speech ... this type of commentary on an
important social institution constitutes protected expression. 78

The Cardtoons court also commented on the potential danger
that publicity rights pose to the public domain. The court noted
that celebrities are "'common points of reference for millions of
individuals who may never interact,''' and that "[t]hrough their per
vasive presence in the media, sports and entertainment celebrities
come to symbolize certain ideas and values.... Celebrities ... are
an important element of the shared communicative resources of our
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
at 969).
78.

Id. at 841.
616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 13, at 13.
95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996).
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 13, at 11 (quoting Cardtoons, L. c., 95 F.3d

Cardtoons, L. c., 95 F.3d at 969.
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cultural domain."79 Overprotection of publicity rights would inevi
tably deprive the public of a valuable component of our modern
marketplace of ideas.
The Tenth Circuit called into question the viability of publicity
rights for professional athletes. With respect to the first Zacchini
justification of incentive, the court bluntly stated, "The extra in
come generated by licensing one's identity does not provide a nec
essary inducement to enter and achieve in the realm of sports and
entertainment. "80 With respect to the second Zacchini justification
of depriving entertainers of the right to make a living, the Tenth
Circuit noted that professional athletes receive a more than ade
quate "rate of return" from their primary profession, and further
more, "even in the absence of publicity rights, celebrities would still
be able to reap financial reward from authorized appearances and
endorsements."81 With respect to the third Zacchini justification of
unjust enrichment, the court observed, "Cardtoons added a signifi
cant creative component of its own to the celebrity identity and cre
ated an entirely new product."82 In addition, the court noted that
"[ c]elebrities ... are often not fully responsible for their fame ....
[F]ame may largely be the creation of the media or the audience."83
Finally, the Tenth Circuit inferred that the right of publicity
may best serve the public if confined to cases that affect an enter
tainer's incentive to perform, such as in Zacchini.
The distinction between the value of a person's identity and the
value of his performance explains why Zacchini ... is a red her
ring.... [T]he Court's incentive rationale is obviously more com
pelling in a right of performance case than in a more typical right
of pUblicity case involving the appropriation of a celebrity's
identity.84

The Tenth Circuit's logical dismantling of professional athletes'
publicity rights would play a pivotal role in influencing the Sixth
Circuit's decision in the ETW Corp. case seven years later.
D.

The Ninth Circuit
The Supreme Court of California and the Ninth Circuit devel
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 972 (citation omitted).
at 974.
at 976.
at 975.
at 973.
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oped the "transformative elements" test through a line of cases be
ginning with White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. ,85 and
ending with Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. 86
In White, television celebrity Vanna White brought suit alleg
ing that the defendant's use of a robot wearing a long gown and
blonde wig who turned letters on a game show set designed to look
like "Wheel of Fortune" constituted a violation of her publicity
rights. 87 The Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment
for the defendant, and a suggestion for rehearing en banc failed. 88
In a blistering dissent, Judge Kozinski explained that overprotection
of such intellectual property rights would cause harm to the public
domain:
Something very dangerous is going on here. . ..
· .. Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as un
derprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public
domain....
· .. Intellectual property rights aren't free: They're imposed
at the expense of future creators and of the public at large....
· .. This is why intellectual property law is full of careful
balances between what's set aside for the owner and what's left
in the public domain for the rest of us....89

The Ninth Circuit's next right of publicity decision came in
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 90 Actor Dustin Hoffman al
leged that a magazine used an unauthorized still photograph from
the movie Tootsie and computer-generated images to falsely depict
him wearing recent spring fashions. 91 The magazine article con
tained sixteen familiar scenes of famous actors that showed what
the actors would look like in contemporary designer clothing. 92
The Ninth Circuit found that the article used "a combination of
fashion photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial com
ment" on classic films, and any commercial aspects were "inextrica
bly entwined with expreSSIve elements."93 The Hoffman
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.

989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
White, 989 F.2d at 1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1512 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1513-16 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id. at 1185.
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"expressive elements" test would serve as the basis of the California
Supreme Court's "transformative elements" test set forth in Com
edy III Productions. 94
Finally, in Comedy III Productions, the owner of all rights to
the Three Stooges comedy team brought suit against an artist sell
ing lithographic prints of the Stooges on T-shirts.95 The court first
found that the drawings were "expressive works," and therefore
were entitled to First Amendment protection because they were not
merely an "advertisement for or endorsement of a product."96 The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the T-shirts lost First
Amendment protection because they were sold in multiple repro
ductions: "[A] reproduction of a celebrity image that ... contains
significant creative elements is entitled to as much First Amend
ment protection as an original work of art. "97
In finding that the plaintiff's publicity rights had been violated,
the court set forth the "transformative elements" test for determin
ing the proper balance between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment:
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or
imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing
on the right of publicity without adding significant expression be
yond that trespass, [the right of publicity trumps the First
Amendment] .... On the other hand, when a work contains
significant transformative elements, it is not only especially wor
thy of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to
interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of
pUblicity.98

The court added that another way to view the test is "whether
the celebrity likeness is one of the 'raw materials' from which an
original work is synthesized," or whether the celebrity image is the
"very sum and substance of the work. "99 The court then added yet
another "useful ... subsidiary inquiry" to be used in close cases:
"[D]oes the marketability and economic value of the challenged
work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted?"lOO
Adding further to the confusion of the "transformative elements"
94.

Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
Id. at 800-01.
96. Id. at 802.
97. Id. at 810.
98. Id. at 808.
99. Id. at 809.
100. Id. at 810.
95.
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test, the court explained that the First Amendment may protect
even literal reproductions of a celebrity, noting that painter Andy
Warhol was able to convey the "dehumanization of celebrity itself"
through literal depiction. lol
After sorting through the semantic acrobatics of the Comedy
III Productions decision, the "transformative elements" test ap
pears to consist of the following elements: First, did the plaintiff
appropriate the defendant's identity for commercial gain without
the plaintiff's consent?l02 If the answer is yes, then the defendant
may assert First Amendment protection as an affirmative defense.
The defendant must show that (1) the use was not a purely com
mercial "advertisement or endorsement of a product," and thus
qualified for First Amendment protection,103 and (2) the use was
not a literal depiction of the celebrity, but contained significant
"transformative elements. "104 Finally, if the court has difficulty de
ciding the prior inquiry, it should find for the plaintiff if the market
ability of the product derives primarily from the celebrity's fame.1 05
To add to the confusion, the Ninth Circuit noted that courts may
completely disregard the "literal depiction" portion of the "trans
formative elements" test in cases featuring "subtle" artists such as
Andy Warho1. 106
Although far from clear, the Comedy III Productions "trans
formative elements" test at least provided some direction for courts
in future right of publicity cases. Two years after Comedy III Pro
ductions, the Sixth Circuit would assay the viability of the Ninth
Circuit "transformative elements" test in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub
lishing, Inc .107

IV.

ETW

CORP.

v.

JIREH PUBLISHING, INC.: THE "TIGER
WOODS" CASE

Sports artist Rick Rush has painted some of America's most
famous athletes for over twenty-five years. Rush's vast collection
of sports paintings includes depictions of Michael Jordan, Wayne
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 811.
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra Part III. D.
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).

note 39.
notes 63-64.
note 100.
note lOI.
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Gretzky, Cal Ripken, and Mark McGwire. 108 In 1997, Rush
painted a picture of Tiger Woods playing golf in the 1997 Master's
Tournament. Entitled "The Masters of Augusta," the painting de
picts "Woods in three different poses, against a backdrop of the
Augusta National clubhouse, the leader board, and images of legen
dary champions, including Sam Snead, Walter Hagan, Bobby Jones,
Ben Hogan, Jack Nicklaus, and Arnold Palmer."109 Rush's pub
lisher, Jireh, distributed limited edition prints of Rush's painting.1 10
The Eldrick Tiger Woods Corporation (ETW) brought suit
against Jireh, alleging (among several other charges) that Jireh vio
lated "Woods's right of publicity under Ohio common law."l11
Jireh countered that the First Amendment protected the prints be
cause they were "artwork" and not commercial speech. 112
A.

The District Court Grants Jireh's Motion for Summary
Judgment

The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio granted Jireh's motion for summary judgment on the right to
publicity claim, holding that Rush's paintings went beyond merely
"propos[ing] a commercial transaction" and were therefore pro
tected by the First Amendment. 113 The court quoted the Second
Circuit's decision in Bery v. City of New York: "[P]aintings, photo
graphs, prints and sculptures ... always communicate some idea or
concept to those who view it, and as such are entitled to full First
Amendment protection."114 The court held that Rush's painting
was "an artistic creation seeking to express a message. The fact that
it is sold is irrelevant to the determination of whether it receives
First Amendment protection."115 Because the First Amendment
protected the painting, the court noted, no balancing test was
needed; the First Amendment always trumps a right of publicity
claim.1 16
108. Jerold A. Greenfield, Artist Fights Tiger Woods Trademark Suit And Wins,
NEWS, Oct. 2003, at 48.
109. Id.
110. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 918.
111. Id. at 919.
112. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
113. Id. at 835-36.
114. Id. at 836 (quoting Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir.
1996».
115. Id.
116. Id.
ART WORLD
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The Sixth Circuit Upholds the District Court Decision

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the District Court's deci
sion, albeit with an entirely different analysis. The court first
looked to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition to deter
mine the common law definition of the right of publicity: "The cur
rent version of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition states
that a person's right of publicity is violated by the '[appropriation
of] the commercial value of a person's identity by using without
consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for
purposes of trade ...."'117 The court utilized the Restatement defi
nition and accompanying comments to articulate a test for finding
whether Woods's right of pUblicity had been violated: "Under this
rule, the substantiality and market effect of the use of the celeb
rity's image is analyzed in light of the informational and creative
content of the defendant's use."118
In concluding that Rush's painting had "substantial informa
tional and creative content which outweighs any adverse effect on
ETW's market," the court noted that Rush's painting consisted of
much more than the literal likeness of Tiger Woods:
It is a panorama of Woods's victory at the 1997 Masters Tourna

ment .... A piece of art that portrays a historic sporting event
communicates and celebrates the value our culture attaches to
such events .... Rush's work conveys the message that Woods
himself will someday join [the revered group of Masters
champions].119

Although the court could have concluded its analysis in finding
that Woods's right of publicity had not been violated, it further
found that Rush's work was "expression which is entitled to the full
protection of the First Amendment. "120 In making its determina
tion, the court referenced Cardtoons: "[S]ports and entertainment
celebrities ... have become a valuable means of expression in our
culture."121 The court held that Rush's prints "are not commercial
speech. They do not propose a commercial transaction. Accord
ingly, they are entitled to the full protection of the First
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
Ass'n, 95

ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 930 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 937.
Id. at 936.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 937-38 (quoting Cardtoons, L.c. v. Major League Baseball Players
F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996».
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Amendment. "122
The court then proceeded to use the Comedy III Productions
"transformative elements" test to balance Woods's publicity rights
against the First Amendment. Before beginning its "transformative
elements" analysis, the court noted that Woods's primary employ
ment was playing golf, not licensing his image.
Woods, like most sports and entertainment celebrities ... en
gages in an activity, professional golf, that in itself generates a
significant amount of income which is unrelated to his right of
pUblicity.... It is not at all clear that the appearance of Woods's
likeness in artwork prints which display one of his major achieve
ments will reduce the commercial value of his likeness. 123

In finding that Rush's prints contained transformative ele
ments, the court essentially echoed its findings with respect to the
Restatement test:
Unlike the unadorned, nearly photographic reproduction of the
faces of The Three Stooges in Comedy III Prods., Inc., Rush's
work does not capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods.
Rather, Rush's work consists of a collage of images in addition to
Woods's image which are combined to describe, in artistic form, a
historic event in sports history and to convey a message about the
significance of Woods's achievement in that event. Because
Rush's work has substantial transformative elements ... Woods's
right of publicity must yield to the First Amendment. 124

Although the ETW Corp. majority applied the correct "trans
formative elements" test to find that the First Amendment trumped
Woods's publicity rights, the opinion as a whole featured several
problems.
C.

Problems with the Majority Opinion

First, although the court found that Woods's right of publicity
had not been violated pursuant to the common law Restatement
test, the court continued to discuss whether Rush's prints should
receive First Amendment protection, and then applied the "trans
formative elements" balancing test. 125 However, the Restatement
inquiry provides essentially the same balancing test as the Comedy
III Productions test. In other words, when the court found that
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 925.
ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 938.
Id.
Id. at 931.
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Woods's right of publicity had not been violated pursuant to the
Restatement test, in essence the court had aLready found that (1)
Rush's work did not merely propose a commercial transaction, and
thus offered "substantial informational and creative content" pro
tected under the First Amendment; and (2) the "substantial infor
mational and creative content" of Rush's work outweighed Woods's
right of pUblicity.126 Thus, by applying both the Restatement test
and the "transformative elements" test, the court balanced Woods's
right of publicity with the First Amendment twice. Assuming argu
endo that the court had reached different conclusions with respect
to the two tests, it is unclear which balancing test would trump.
More importantly, once the court stated that Woods's right of pub
licity had not been violated, the inquiry should have ended.
Second, the court may not have correctly applied the Comedy
III Productions "transformative elements" test. Comedy III Pro
ductions makes clear that the "transformative elements" test should
be utilized as an affirmative defense,127 The Sixth Circuit, however,
failed to make clear which party had the burden of proving whether
Rush's work contained transformative elements. In fact, the ETW
Corp. court seemed to apply all three tests (i.e. the Restatement
test, the First Amendment test, and the "transformative elements"
test) as threshold inquiries in determining whether Woods's right of
publicity had been violated. Moreover, assuming the court did ap
ply the "transformative elements" test as an affirmative defense,
the test would have been moot because the court had already found
that Woods's right of publicity had not been violated.
Finally, the court considered the "literal depiction" prong of
the Comedy III Productions test, but failed to inquire into the sub
sidiary "marketability" prong. Although the Comedy III Produc
tions court merely offered the second prong as a "subsidiary
inquiry" which courts "may find useful ... in close cases," it would
be difficult to argue that ETW Corp. was not a "close" case. 128

126. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 808-10 (holding that the First
Amendment right of creators of significantly transformative works may supersede a
trademark holder's commercial rights).
127. Id. at 810 (holding that "[i]n sum, when an artist is faced with a right of
publicity challenge to his or her work, he or she may raise as affirmative defense that
the work is protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant trans
formative elements").
128. Id.
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Judge Clay's Dissent

The ETW Corp. majority opinion clearly left itself vulnerable
to criticism, which was plentifully supplied by Judge Clay's dissent.
Judge Clay first pointed out the obvious: "The majority makes a
somewhat disjointed holding regarding Plaintiff's right of publicity
claim ... it appears that the majority engages in three separate
analyses, and arrives at three separate holdings, although all of
which reach the same result."129
According to Judge Clay, the Comedy III Productions "trans
formative elements" test was "the approach best suited" for deter
mining whether Rush's prints deserved First Amendment
protection,l3O Applying the test, Clay observed that it was difficult
to "discern any appreciable transformative or creative contribution
in Defendant's prints."l3l Clay argued that Rush's "overall goal"
was to create "literal, conventional depictions of [Tiger Woods] so
as to exploit his ... fame [such that Rush's] right of free expression
is outweighed by [Woods's] right of publicity."132
Nevertheless, Judge Clay's "transformative elements" analysis
cut away from the Comedy III Productions "literal depiction" in
quiry and instead considered whether the "focus" of the work was
the celebrity: "[T]he clear focus of the work is Woods in full body
image ... the focus of the print is not the Masters Tournament or
the other golfers . . . but that of Woods holding his famous golf
swing while at that tournament."133 To exemplify his point, Judge
Clay noted that the narrative accompanying the prints expressly
discussed Woods, reading in part, "the center of [other golfers']
gaze is 1997 winner Tiger Woods."134 Therefore, Judge Clay con
cluded, "it is clear that the prints gain their commercial value by
exploiting the fame and celebrity status that Woods has worked to
achieve. "135
However, apart from one sentence mentioning that Rush's
overall goal was to create "literal, conventional" depictions of
Woods,136 Judge Clay failed to explain why he viewed Rush's paint
ing as a literal depiction of Woods. Instead, Judge Clay concen
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 951 (Clay, J., dissenting).
Id. at 952.
Id. at 959.
Id. (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 811).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 959.
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trated on the Comedy III Productions subsidiary "marketability"
inquiry, arguing that the focus of Rush's painting is Tiger Woods,
and therefore, that the prints gain their commercial value by ex
ploiting Woods's celebrity.l37
In sum, although Judge Clay ostensibly found that Rush's pic
ture was a literal depiction of Woods, his analysis gave only lip
service to the Comedy III Productions literal depiction inquiry.
Thus, both the majority and dissent applications of the "transforma
tive elements" test are suspect.

v.

BEYOND TRANSFORMATIVE: THE FUTURE OF THE RIGHT
OF PUBLICITY

The Sixth Circuit decision in ETW Corp. has given courts little
guidance in how properly to balance the right of publicity with the
First Amendment. Following this controversial decision, many
commentators have weighed in on how effective balancing should
be conducted in the future. Nevertheless, the proposed "solutions"
are often more fraught with problems than the test applied in ETW
Corp.
A.

The "Marketability" Test

The majority of commentators has argued that the ETW Corp.
majority did not give enough deference to the "marketability"
prong of the Comedy III Productions test. Michael Breslin believes
that a "proper analysis" of the transformative test "would not have
ignored the lack of transformative elements in the images of Woods
himself nor would it have ignored the subsidiary inquiry as to the
true source of the painting's marketability."13s To further his point,
Breslin posits the question, "How marketable would the painting be
if a generic golfer, rather than Tiger Woods, was the centerpiece of
the work?"139 Breslin argues that the "marketability" analysis
would prevent "trivial elements" and "a few supplementary ele
ments in the backdrop" of a work from diverting judges' attention
away from where the true economic value of a painting lies. 140
Jacy Jasmer believes that the "transformative elements" test
should apply as an affirmative defense, where the defendant not
only has the burden of showing that the artwork "contains signifi
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.

at
at
at
at

959-60.
393.
392.
391.
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cant transformative elements," but also that the "marketability and
economic value of the challenged work [does not] derive from the
fame of the celebrity depicted."141 Thus, Jasmer believes that the
Comedy III Productions test should be modified in that the "subsid
iary inquiry" should be promoted to a mandatory inquiry that must
be proven before a defendant is afforded First Amendment
protection. 142
On the other hand, heavy reliance on the marketability inquiry
would cause vast overprotection of publicity rights at the expense of
the public domain. For example, few would argue that a biography
of Michael Jordan does not contain "expressive elements" such that
it should be afforded First Amendment protection, regardless of the
fact that it is sold commercially. It is equally difficult, however, to
argue that the primary marketability of such a biography would not
stem primarily from the fame of Michael Jordan,143 Under Bres
lin's "marketability" test, Michael Jordan would be able to sue bi
ographers at will. Moreover, even under Jasmer's more liberal
"transformative elements" test, a biographer might satisfy the "ex
pressive elements" prong, but would always fail to meet his burden
of proving that the marketability of the biography does not stem
primarily from the celebrity of its subject.
The dangers of relying on a work's "marketability" are not
unique to biographies. Many expressive works utilizing celebrity
personas derive their primary marketability from the celebrity who
is depicted, including T-shirts, magazines, posters, and television
programs. For example, parody, a form of speech that has been
historically protected by courts under the First Amendment, would
be in danger. Could the estate of James Dean sue artist Gottfried
Helnwein for his parody Boulevard of Broken Dreams, which fea
tures Dean and other tragic celebrity figures? As Breslin would
argue, if Dean, Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley, and Humphrey Bo
gart were replaced with four "generic" figures, the painting would
be virtually worthless. Similarly, baseball trading cards would also
be subject to right of publicity claims, and the Tenth Circuit's hold
ing in Cardtoons would be turned on its head.
Thus, the Comedy III Productions subsidiary inquiry should
141. Jasmer, supra note 58, at 335 (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001)).
142. See id.
143. In rare cases, it could be argued that the author would be of such fame that
loyal readers would read a biography regardless of the subject. Nevertheless, this
would obviously be the exception, and not the general rule.
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not be utilized because it sets forth a virtually insurmountable hur
dle for the First Amendment. Even the most artistic use of a celeb
rity image often derives most of its marketability from the
celebrity's fame; if a "generic" person were used, biographies and
portraits would be deprived of their substance. In sum, regardless
of the "expressive" content of the work, defendants would be at a
loss to prove that consumers are attracted to a work because of its
expressive elements alone and not the celebrity depicted. As the
Tenth Circuit noted in Cardtoons, social comment and marketable
celebrity personas are often inextricably intertwined.

B.

The "Transformative Elements" Test

Although less problematic than the pure marketability test, the
basic Comedy III Productions transformative elements test still suf
fers from an array of problems. The ETW Corp. decision highlights
many of the test's inefficiencies.
First, the transformative elements test is impossible to apply
consistently. The Supreme Court of California admitted as much in
Comedy III Productions: "Although the distinction between pro
tected and unprotected expression will sometimes be subtle, it is no
more so than other distinctions triers of fact are called on to make
in First Amendment jurisprudence."144
One need look no further than the ETW Corp. decision to
demonstrate the inherent unpredictability of the transformative ele
ments test. The majority found that Rush's painting consisted of
"much more than a mere literal likeness of Woods," and was in fact
a "piece of art that portrays a historic sporting event" and "com
municates and celebrates the value our culture attaches to such
events."145 Conversely, Judge Clay found it "difficult to discern any
appreciable transformative or creative contribution" in Rush's
prints.1 46 Thus, the transformative elements test is far from a bright
line rule that can be applied consistently; judges' subjective percep
tions of what constitutes artistic expression determine how a right
of pUblicity case is decided. Of course, an attempt to define objec
tively what constitutes artistic expression or a "literal depiction"
would undoubtedly be even more problematic.
Second, courts seem confused as to whether the transformative
144. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001).
145. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis
added).
146. Id. at 959 (Clay, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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elements test should be applied as an affirmative defense. Al
though the Comedy III Productions court explicitly formulated the
test as SUCh,147 the court in ETW Corp. seemed to place the burden
of proof on the plaintiff,148 Much of the confusion in ETW Corp. is
attributable to the fact that the court first applied the Restatement
test, which is virtually the same as the transformative elements test
except for the Restatement's burden of proof, which is on the celeb
rity plaintiff in the first instance. 149
Nevertheless, so long as there is a right of publicity that needs
to be balanced against the First Amendment, the transformative el
ements test may well be the proverbial least of many evils. The test
is at least feasible in that it (1) gives proper deference to First
Amendment concerns; (2) allows courts the flexibility "to make
necessary fact specific deterrninations;"lso and (3) is far superior to
most alternative approaches. 1S1 In fact, when compared to other
proposed solutions, the transformative elements test looks like a
veritable stroke of genius by the Supreme Court of California.
C.

Other Proposed Solutions

Legal scholars have proffered several other solutions to the
right of publicity dilemma. First, one scholar has proposed the
elimination of subjectivity entirely by classifying works into one of
two categories: "Popular Art" or "Fine Art."lS2 This "Cultural
Niche Theory" asks the finder of fact to "determine whether a
work's purpose is to 'entertain, to stimulate emotion or project sen
timentality' [evidence suggesting 'Popular Art'] or to 'exhibit a per
sonal expression, originality, [or] creativity' [evidence suggesting
'Fine Art']."lS3 The First Amendment would protect celebrity per
sonas used in "Fine Art," whereas the use of celebrity personas in
"Popular Art" would not be protected. 1S4
The problems with this test are too numerous to mention in
their entirety, but include the following: (1) the test is not objective,
147. Comedy III Prods., Inc. 21 P.3d at 808.
148. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 930, 937 (6th Cir. 2003).
149. Id.
150. Jasmer, supra note 58, at 313.
151. Id.
152. Pete Singer, Note, The Three Stooges' Latest Act: Attempting to Define the
Scope of Protection the First Amendment Provides to Works of Art Depicting Celebrities,
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderap, Inc., 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 330-37 (2002).
Contra Jasmer, supra note 58, at 320-23.
153. Jasmer, supra note 58, at 320.
154. Id. at 305 n.82.
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and merely passes the subjective judgment of what "category" a
work falls into from the judge to the jury; (2) some (if not most) art
could fall into either category; and (3) by focusing on the "type"
and "quality" of art and not the amount of celebrity fame appropri
ated, the test completely ignores the critical inquiry in publicity
rights cases, specifically whether the defendant is using the celebrity
for expressive purposes or merely free-riding on the celebrity's
fame. To quote the Comedy III Productions court, the "inquiry is
in a sense more quantitative than qualitative."155
Next, a number of scholars have proposed incorporating the
entire "fair use" defense from copyright law and applying it to right
of publicity cases.1 56 "However, 'the factors used in copyright anal
ysis do not readily lend themselves to right of publicity claims."'157
As the court in Comedy III Productions explained,
We conclude that a wholesale importation of the fair use doctrine
into right of pUblicity law would not be advisable. At least two of
the factors employed in the fair use test, 'the nature of the copy
righted work' and 'the amount and substantiality of the portion
used' seem particularly designed to be applied to the partial cop
ying of works .. .'fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression' it is
difficult to understand why these factors would be especially use
ful for determining whether the depiction of a celebrity likeness
is protected by the First Amendment. 15S

Furthermore, the next factor, "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work," would not
only be difficult to ascertain in the right of publicity context, but
may tip the balance toward plaintiffs because "it could be argued
that if a defendant has capitalized in any way on a celebrity's image,
he or she has found a potential market and therefore could be liable
for such work."159 Since this factor would almost always cut against
the defendant, the defendant would "face what is effectively a pre
sumption of infringement" from the outset. 160
Moreover, the aims of copyright and the right of publicity are
155. Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001).
156. Jasmer, supra note 58, at 323.
157. [d. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining
the Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 492
(2003».
158. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 807-08 (citations omitted) (alterations in
the original).
159. /d. at 808-09 n.10.
160. Jasmer, supra note 58, at 323.
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divergent. Copyright law "protects the primary, if not only source,
of a writer's income, and thus provides a significant incentive for
creativity and achievement."161 The right of publicity, however,
only protects this incentive in the limited context of "performance"
cases such as Zacchini because the commercial value of profes
sional athlete and celebrity identities is "merely a by-product of
their performance values."162 Copyright is designed to balance art
ists' rights and the need for a rich public domain by affording art
ists' exclusive rights for a limited duration. Conversely, many
jurisdictions "have held that the right of pUblicity exists posthu
mously and is both inheritable and devisable," with no limited time
duration. 163 Thus, it makes little sense blindly to import copyright
doctrine to right of publicity cases.
VI.

SHOULD PUBLICITY RIGHTS BE PROTECTED? DEBUNKING
THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

As one critic of publicity rights astutely noted, "[F]ame pre
existed the right of publicity and no one apparently needed the
law's protection to become famous before this century."164 Inher
ent in this simple statement is a fundamental question: Do we need
a right of pUblicity for professional athletes and celebrities at all?
To answer this question, it is necessary to re-examine the three
justifications for the right of publicity as given by the Supreme
Court in Zacchini: (1) it provides celebrities an economic incentive
to invest in creating performances; (2) it keeps others from interfer
ing with the celebrity's right to make a living; and (3) it prevents
unjust enrichment and misappropriation of the celebrity's
goodwil1. 165
A.

Incentive and the Right to Make a Living

As previously noted, the first two justifications make little
sense when applied to professional athletes and celebrities outside
the Zacchini context. To reiterate, the "incentive" rationale is only
compelling in "right of performance" cases, where a performer is
161. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 973
(10th Cir. 1996).
162. Id.
163. Jasmer, supra note 58, at 297.
164. Vincent M. de Grandpre, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An Eco
nomic Analysis of the Right of Publicity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J, 73, 103 (2001).
165. See supra text accompanying note 58.
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deprived of the economic incentive to invest in his primary source
of his income. 166 As the Tenth Circuit noted, "[I]t is unlikely that
little leaguers will stop dreaming of the big leagues or major leagu
ers will start 'dogging it' to first base" if the right of publicity did
not exist.1 67 The second Zacchini justification is also only compel
ling in "right of performance" cases; allowing Rick Rush to paint an
image of Tiger Woods will not interfere with Woods's ability to
make a living as a professional golfer.
Michael Breslin counters that courts such as the one that de
cided ETW Corp. ignore the long hours of labor required for an
athlete to attain fame and fortune. 168 Specifically, Breslin believes
that the implications of downplaying the second Zacchini justifica
tion are "disturbingly straightforward: the more money you earn,
the less right you have to control how people exploit your im
age."169 Breslin's analysis, however, misses the point.
Courts such as those that decided ETW Corp. and Cardtoons
are not making distinctions based on the amount of wealth, but
rather on the source of wealth.17° Even if Zacchini had made mil
lions from his "human cannonball" act, the Supreme Court would
likely still have found a violation of his right of publicity because his
performance (or his primary means of employment) was appropri
ated and shown for free, which thereby threatened his ability to
make a living off that performance. l7l Zacchini's wealth was en
tirely irrelevant to the outcome of the case. Similarly, if Rush had
painted a picture of a famous ballplayer who had recently declared
bankruptcy, ETW Corp. would have had the same result because
"the commercial value of [his] identity" would be merely a "by
product" of his performance value, and thus would not affect the
player's ability to make a living by playing baseball.1 72
B.

Unjust Enrichment

"Unjust enrichment" is the sole remaining justification for giv
ing professional athletes publicity rights. This argument is justified
on two grounds: First, professional athletes and celebrities should
166. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
167. Cardtoons, L.c., 95 F.3d at 974.
168. Breslin, supra note 1, at 384-85.
169. Id. at 385.
170. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); see also
Cardtoons, L. c., 95 F.3d at 959.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
172. See Cardtoons, L. c., 95 F.3d at 973.
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be allowed to enjoy the fruits of their labors, and second, no "social
purpose is served" by allowing others to get a "free ride" off of
someone else's goodwill.173
Inherent in the first argument is the belief that people have
earned the right to control and profit from their commercial identi
ties. Nevertheless, celebrities "are often not fully responsible for
their fame ... a celebrity's fame may largely be the creation of the
media or the audience."174 A celebrity "cannot make herself fa
mous any more than [s]he can make [her]self loved. "175 Although
professional athletes are arguably more responsible for their celeb
rity status than entertainment celebrities, it is also true that "[m]any
people make valuable contributions to society without receiving
compensation that reflects every cent of that value. "176 An amicus
brief in support of ETW Corp. sets forth this argument as follows:
[J]udges ... create social value far in excess of their compensa
tion. Law professors, too, have never expected royalties from
former students . . . although arguably the information the
professors produce is a factor in producing the high income many
earn in practice .... As long as the rewards are adequate to
induce talented people into teaching, onto the bench, or into the
business of making desirable products, how excess value should
be distributed is a policy question and not one of justice ....
[C]elebrities have no greater claim to the excess value they gen
erate than do any other economic actors in the society.l77
The free-rider argument also has flaws in the context of First
Amendment cases such as Cardtoons, Comedy III Productions, and
ETW Corp. For example, in ETW Corp. it was argued that "a sub
stantial part of the value of the Rush print must, in all fairness, be
attributed to Rush's own talent and fame as a sports artist."178 In
deed, it is difficult to argue that a celebrity's fame is the only reason
anyone would purchase a product; would a three-year-old's crayon
drawing of the Three Stooges or Tiger Woods generally be a mar
ketable product? The answer is likely in the negative.
Similarly, in the advertising context, it could be argued that
merely placing a celebrity's likeness in the background of a com
173. [d. at 975-76.
174. Id. at 975 (citing Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popu
lar Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127,184-96 (1993».
175. Jasmer, supra note 58, at 298.
176. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 13, at 29.
177. Id. at 29-30.
178. Id. at 28.
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mercial would not instantly make that commercial successful. A
commercial's popularity also depends on the skill of the marketing
department in generating humor or a memorable sales pitch. For
example, in White, Samsung used the "robot" Vanna White to con
vey that Samsung would exist many years into the future. 179 As
Judge Kozinski noted, "Samsung's ad didn't simply copy White's
schtick-like all parody, it created something new."180 Further
more, most advertisement right of publicity cases that fall outside of
the "false endorsement" context do not explicitly invoke the
"name, likeness, signature or voice of a celebrity," but many courts
now grant celebrities an "exclusive right to anything that reminds
the viewer of [the celebrity]. "181 Judge Kozinski believes that
"[t]he right to draw ideas from a rich and varied public domain, and
the right to mock, for profit as well as fun, the cultural icons of our
time" should limit celebrity "rights" of such broad proportion. 182
It should be noted that if a commercial utilizes a celebrity im
age to suggest falsely that the celebrity is endorsing the product, the
unjust enrichment argument is infinitely more persuasive. Never
theless, "[t]he Lanham Act ... already provides nationwide protec
tion against false or misleading representations in connection with
the sale of products."183 Moreover, a "false endorsement" tort
strictly limited to such claims would provide a far more suitable so
lution than the right of publicity, which is infinitely broader in
scope.

C.

Emotional Injury

Several other justifications have been offered in support of a
right of publicity, most of which are of little merit. One argument is
that the right of publicity prevents "emotional injuries."l84 "Public
ity rights, however, are meant to protect against the loss of financial
179. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.
1993) (dissenting opinion).
180. Id. at 1517.
181. Id. at 1515 (emphasis in original).
182. Id. at 1521.
183. Cardtoons, L.c. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 975
(10th Cir. 1996). Whether the Lanham Act offers adequate compensation for celebri
ties who are falsely suggested to endorse a product is a separate question which requires
an article to itself, and therefore is not addressed here. Nevertheless, it would clearly
be ill-advised for the courts to maintain a right of publicity solely because the Lanham
Act does not offer adequate compensation. Congress could better address the issue.
184. Id. at 976.
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gain, not mental anguish."185 In addition, tort laws prohibiting the
"intentional infliction of emotional distress" are available. 186 Fur
thermore, defamation law has made clear that those who enjoy the
"public limelight" assume the risk of criticism. 187
D.

Efficient Allocation of Resources

Some courts and commentators have argued that "the right of
pUblicity ... promotes the efficient allocation of resources. "188 This
"tragedy of the commons" line of argument posits that "[w]ithout
the artificial scarcity created by publicity rights, identities would be
commercially exploited until the marginal value of each use is
zero. "189 First, this argument is not persuasive outside the advertis
ing context, as frequent use of a celebrity image may actually in
crease its value "precisely because 'everybody's got one."'190 For
instance, aT-shirt featuring Britney Spears may act as an advertise
ment of sorts for her "celebrity" status. The T-shirt would in effect
promote Spears, and therefore increase the value of her celebrity;
the more T-shirts that are created, the more promotion Spears's
celebrity receives.
Moreover, in the advertising context, Michael Madow argues
that well before the advertising value of a celebrity's persona de
creases to zero due to overexploitation, advertisers will replace her
with a "fresh face" from an unlimited alternative supply: "After all,
there would be no 'tragedy' in the classic parable if the herdsmen,
after depleting their common pasture, could simply move on to an
other one."191 If one thing is clear, it is that society is in no danger
of running out of celebrities or professional athletes anytime soon.
CONCLUSION

Upon analyzing the justifications for the right of publicity, one
could conclude that the right of publicity should be limited to "right
of performance" cases such as Zacchini, where the plaintiff's incen
185. Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573
(1977); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438-39 (Cal. 1979».
186. Cardtoons, L. c., 95 F.3d at 976.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 974.
189. Id. (citing Matthyws v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1994».
190. Id. at 975 (quoting Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 167-78 (1993» (emphasis
added).
191. Madow, supra note 191, at 224.
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tive and ability to make a living from his or her performance is
endangered. 192 In addition, courts and legislatures could fashion a
limited "false endorsement" tort to protect celebrities from adver
tisers who falsely suggest that a celebrity endorses a product.
Apart from "right of performance" and "false endorsement"
cases, the most persuasive argument for a right of pUblicity can be
made in cases in which an advertiser skillfully appropriates an ath
lete's image without implying that the celebrity endorses the prod
uct being sold. But even where an advertiser uses a celebrity's
image solely for the purpose of proposing a commercial transaction,
there are valid arguments that the advertiser is not entirely "un
justly enriched" - not only is the athlete's fame not completely
attributable to the athlete (both the public and the media play a
role), but, as in White, the advertiser's skill and talent also playa
part in the commercial's appeal.193
Thus, at most, the right of publicity should be confined to
"right of performance" cases and traditional commercial advertise
ments. In cases such as Hoffman where it is unclear whether the
commercial use constitutes an "advertisement,"194 the "transforma
tive elements" test 195 should be used to determine whether the use
is protected by the First Amendment.
When an individual's tentative property right collides with the
First Amendment and the public domain, the public domain should
always be given great deference. This should hold true even when
the individual in question is Tiger Woods.

192. See supra text accompanying
193. See supra text accompanying
194. See supra text accompanying
195. See supra text accompanying
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